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Abstract
The paper examines the impact of industrial protection, agricultural export taxes, and overvaluation of the
exchange rate on the balance between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Various agricultural
terms-of-trade indices are constructed to measure the policy bias against agriculture in a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) framework and compare the results with earlier partial equilibrium measures. Our
results indicate that the partial equilibrium measures miss much of the action operating through indirect
product and factor market linkages, while overstating the strength of the linkages between changes in the
exchange rate and prices of traded goods on the agricultural terms of trade.
1. Introduction
Empirical studies on the effects of government price interventions in developing coun-
tries, especially those undertaken since the early 1980s, support the view that there was
substantial policy bias against agriculture.1 First, producer prices are often found to
have been suppressed directly by sector-specific policies, commonly in the form of agri-
cultural export taxation or the pricing policy of parastatal marketing organizations.
Second, economywide policies, including trade and macroeconomic policies that 
influence the real exchange rate, are shown to have had significant indirect effects,
invariably adverse, on agricultural incentives. In most cases, the indirect impact of econ-
omywide policies is found to be more important than the effect of direct government
interventions.
In taking into account the additional effect on agricultural incentives arising from
indirect government interventions, these studies have gone beyond the narrow, sec-
toral orientation of traditional agricultural policy analysis. However, in general, they
have relied on analytical frameworks that are partial equilibrium. Economists have
long recognized that the partial measures used in applied work are incomplete 
and that a general equilibrium framework is needed to capture all the interactions 
that determine the net relative impact of a mix of policies on the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. “Policy bias” is inherently an economywide, general equilibrium
concept. Nevertheless, to date there has been no systematic evaluation of the extent
of agricultural bias of government interventions using a general equilibrium 
framework.
Another critical problem with partial equilibrium approaches is that they typically
assume perfect substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods,
as well as between domestic products for export and for internal use. Under these
assumptions, we should never observe two-way trade (“cross-hauling”) at the com-
modity level. If a good is tradable, the “law of one price” holds and changes in world
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prices should be completely translated into changes in domestic prices; and the respon-
siveness of domestic prices to changes in world prices or in trade policies should not
depend on the shares of trade in sectoral demand or supply.
All these implications of the law of one price are empirically suspect.2 For example,
two-way trade is observed in highly disaggregated sectoral data for virtually all coun-
tries (de Melo and Robinson, 1981). Within agriculture in developing countries, there
are also significant shares of nontraded goods or goods with very low trade shares. In
any case, price transmission elasticities vary widely across sectors. Evidence for major
traded agricultural commodities indicates that price transmission elasticities are close
to 1 for developed countries, although significantly lower for developing countries
(Mundlak and Larson, 1992). Ardeni (1989), on the other hand, finds that changes in
world prices or trade policy measures are generally only partially transmitted through
to prices of domestic substitutes. In general, elasticities of substitution and transfor-
mation are much lower for industrial goods in developing countries, especially inter-
mediates and capital goods.
By contrast, a widely used specification in multisector, trade-focused, computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models is that imports are imperfect substitutes for domes-
tically produced goods with the same sectoral classification. Similarly, in many models,
exports are also differentiated from domestically produced goods sold on the domes-
tic market. This formulation removes the extreme dichotomy between tradable and
nontradable goods, allowing differing degrees of tradability corresponding to different
values of the substitution and transformation elasticities (which are either infinite or
zero in the partial equilibrium approach, depending on whether the good is traded or
not). This specification gives some realistic autonomy to the domestic price system in
the model and can account for cross-hauling.3
In this paper, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that incorpo-
rates the more realistic assumption of imperfect substitutability to provide a compre-
hensive framework to capture the various repercussions of policy interventions and
measure their impact on agriculture.4 Assuming that the economic environment is
characterized by trade policy distortions such as the ones in focus in Krueger et al.
(1988), we will consider the differences between general equilibrium measures of the
agricultural sector bias with the results of partial equilibrium analysis.5 Following this
introduction, the partial equilibrium measures used in previous work are presented.
Section 3 discusses how the bias against agriculture can be measured in a CGE model,
and indicates why this frame of reference is preferable to the partial equilibrium
approach. The results of a series of policy experiments designed to provide answers to
the questions raised above are reported in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2. Agricultural Bias: Partial Equilibrium, No Product Differentiation
Assuming perfect substitutability between domestically produced and traded goods,
a change in the world price will—under competitive conditions—lead to the same
change in the domestic market price of the traded good. However, government 
policies can drive wedges between foreign and domestic prices. Krueger et al. (1988;
KSV hereafter) developed partial equilibrium measures of the impact of these 
policies on agricultural producer prices. These measures are used to assess whether 
the policy-induced incentive structure favors or discriminates against agricultural 
production; i.e., whether the sector is protected or not relative to nonagriculture. They
distinguish between policies that have direct and indirect effects on agricultural 
incentives.
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Policies with direct effects include agricultural sector-specific import and export
taxes, price controls, and production taxes and subsidies, all of which affect the wedge
between producer and border prices of agricultural products. Policies with indirect
effects on agricultural incentives, on the other hand, include the exchange rate, which
affects the economywide balance between traded and nontraded goods, and import
tariffs on nonagricultural products. Contrary to the assumption used by KSV, we rec-
ognize below the latter’s influence on the exchange rate.
Following KSV (but using different notation), let PXiag be the domestic producer
price of a specific tradable agricultural product iag, PX ¢iag the border-price equivalent
at the official exchange rate E0, and PXAGN the nonagricultural producer price index
defined as the weighted average of nonagricultural producer prices. The relative pro-
ducer prices of agricultural products vis-à-vis the nonagricultural aggregate price are
given by Piag = PXiag/PXAGN and P ¢iag = PX ¢iag /PXAGN.
The direct agricultural bias against products indexed by iag is defined as the pro-
portionate deviation of relative prices from what they would have been without direct
interventions:
(1)
This measure captures the impact on producer incentives of commodity-specific poli-
cies, and it corresponds to the widely used “nominal protection rate” in the empirical
trade literature.
Let PX*iag be the border price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate E*, and
define (PXAGN)* as the nonagricultural price index where the tradable part is evaluated
at E*, defined as a situation with a sustainable trade balance and no trade restrictions.
In this case, E* differs from E0 to the extent that the current account is set at an unsus-
tainable level and trade interventions are in place. The relative price is given by P*iag =
PX*iag /(PXAGN )*, where (PXAGN)* = a(PXtAGN)* + (1 - a)PXntAGN, and Xt refers to tradable
goods (whose price is evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate, E*) and Xnt refers
to nontraded, nonagricultural goods.
The indirect agricultural bias against the sector indexed by iag is the proportionate
deviation of PX ¢iag from PX*iag:
(2)
This measure is meant to capture the indirect effects on producer incentives of the
exchange rate disequilibrium (E0 differing from E*) and of trade policy affecting PXAGN
(e.g., industrial protection). The implicit assumption that PXAGN /(PXAGN )* and E0/E* are
independent shows that the partial equilibrium framework does not capture intersec-
toral price linkages and also assumes no repercussion through changes in the exchange
rate induced by the price changes.6
The exchange rate affects the terms-of-trade (ToT) ratio depending on the shares
of traded and nontraded goods within the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors.
If all goods in the economy are tradable, then the exchange rate is irrelevant since,
in that case, all domestic relative prices are set by world prices. The exchange rate 
is important precisely because there are nontraded goods. In the KSV studies, the 
agricultural products considered were tradable (i.e., with some observed exports or
imports) and some nonagricultural goods were not tradable. In that environment,
exchange rate changes affect tradable agriculture much more than partially nontraded
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nonagriculture. Considering agriculture as a whole, it is important to consider non-
traded agricultural goods in defining aggregate ToT indices.
The total agricultural bias against sector iag can be represented by the proportion-
ate deviation of PXiag from PX*iag:
(3)
which captures the effects of both direct and indirect government interventions.
The three measures are related as follows:
(4)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is a modified measure of the direct
agricultural bias, which is usually smaller (in absolute value) than the nominal protec-
tion rate since PX ¢iag is typically less than PX*iag in developing countries.
In contrast with the partial equilibrium measures used in the World Bank studies,
which are concerned with producer price incentives only, a general equilibrium
approach will capture intersectoral resource shifts, product differentiation in produc-
tion and demand, and the effect of induced price changes on the equilibrium exchange
rate. The result is a richer specification of the price system and a more complete
concept of agricultural bias.
3. Agricultural Bias: General Equilibrium and Product Differentiation
If domestically produced and imported goods (DCi and Mi, respectively) are imper-
fect substitutes, the price of the domestic good, PDCi, will no longer be equal to the
domestic-currency price of the import substitute, PMi, as in the partial equilibrium
framework. Similarly, if there is imperfect substitutability between domestic products
for export (Ei) and for internal use, their prices—PEi and PDAi, respectively—will not
be identical. It follows that the domestic prices of exported and imported products are
not determined by the law of one price.
Structure of the Applied CGE Approach
Following Armington (1969), we can introduce product differentiation by defining a
composite good Qi which is a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function of the
domestic product DCi and the import substitute Mi. Likewise, a production good Xi
can be defined as a CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function of the domes-
tic product in sector i for internal use DAi and for export Ei. Under the small-country
assumption (i.e., the country’s imports have an infinitely elastic world supply and its
exports have an infinitely elastic world demand), world prices of imports, pwmi, and 
of exports, PWEi, are determined exogenously. The domestic prices of imported and
exported products are given by
(5)
(6)
respectively, where EXR is the exchange rate (in domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency), and tmi and tei are the implicit tariff and export tax rates, respectively, that
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take account of the legal tariffs and export taxes as well as any quantitative trade
restrictions and direct price controls that affect the disparity between the domestic and
border prices of traded goods.
From the underlying general equilibrium model used here, the relationships between
relative prices and quantities are
(7)
(8)
We use the convention that CES and CET refer to “constant elasticity of substitution”
and “constant elasticity of transformation” functions, while CES* and CET* refer 
to the corresponding first-order conditions for utility maximization and profit 
maximization.
Sectoral composite good prices are the weighted averages of the domestic prices of
their component products:
(9)
(10)
where the CES and CET functions refer to cost functions relating the composite prices
to their component prices. They reflect the first-order conditions described above.
Equations (5)–(10) are embedded in the structure of a computable general equilib-
rium model incorporating differentiated products. This model permits the determina-
tion of the direct effects of government interventions (captured in tmi and tei) on
agricultural prices, and also their indirect effects through intersectoral linkages and
induced changes in the exchange rate.7
To make the CGE agricultural bias results derived in this study as comparable as
possible to the partial measures described above, we adapt the CGE model to provide
a “clean” theoretical starting point for measuring policy bias and also use the frame-
work for doing controlled experiments that isolate particular effects.
First, in the model, factor markets have been segmented with respect to aggregate
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Labor and capital can move between sectors
within agriculture and nonagriculture, but cannot move between agriculture and non-
agriculture. In this model, the derived agricultural sector bias measures reflect only
price changes and intrasectoral resource shifts. The partial equilibrium measures focus
only on prices, and so indicate potential resource pulls if factors were free to move
between agriculture and nonagriculture. In the CGE model, by restricting factor mobil-
ity between agriculture and nonagriculture, the resulting equilibrium prices, and mea-
sures of bias based on them, should be comparable to the partial equilibrium measures.
In an “unrestricted” CGE model, allowing inter-aggregate-sector factor mobility,
adjustment would include both price and quantity effects. In general, allowing quan-
tity adjustment will reduce price adjustment, so the segmentation should lead to price
effects which are upper bounds. Indeed, the most appropriate measure of bias would
be to allow full factor mobility and measure changes in value-added across sectors with
removal (or addition) of distorting policies.
Second, as the base for our experiments, we create a distortion-free benchmark solu-
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tion of the model to provide the theoretically best reference point for the analysis.
Given existing distortions reflected in the base data, analysis of policy experiments 
is made difficult because there are potential “second best” effects from imposition of
new taxes. To achieve an undistorted economic environment, the model is solved after
setting all production, sales, and trade taxes to zero. The lost revenue is made up by
means of a nondistorting lump-sum income tax on households, yielding the base value
of government revenue—a standard approach in public finance models. This undis-
torted base solution is the starting point against which we compare all our experiments.
Third, the general equilibrium model incorporates the indirect effect of changes in
tariffs and export subsidies on the economy through their impact on the equilibrium
exchange rate—an indirect effect ignored in the partial equilibrium approach. To
isolate this effect, we run a variant of the tariff and export subsidy experiments in which
we fix the exchange rate, and so “turn off” this mechanism. In order to fix the exchange
rate, we have specified a different macro “closure” and assumed that the trade balance
adjusts endogenously.
Fourth, in the KSV methodology, overvaluation of the exchange rate is a major
source of policy bias against agriculture.8 In a general equilibrium context, EXR
represents the equilibrium exchange rate that is jointly determined by the remaining
variables of the model, especially the balance of trade. The equilibrium exchange 
rate corresponding to a situation with no trade distortion and a “sustainable” (perhaps
zero) trade balance E* can be calculated with the CGE model, which provides a unified
framework incorporating all relative prices, including the real exchange rate. Unlike
KSV, no separate model is required to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate. To
measure the effect of changes in the exchange rate only (i.e., with no changes in 
distorting sectoral taxes), we report on a set of additional experiments where we sys-
tematically reduce the trade balance to zero, and solve for the resulting equilibrium
exchange rates, and all other prices and quantities. The results show the sensitivity of
the various agricultural ToT measures with respect to depreciation arising from the
elimination of the trade deficit.
Finally, since the focus of the analysis is on the production rather than the con-
sumption side, the nontraded producer price index of goods sold on the domestic
market has been chosen as the numéraire of the model. For this choice, the solution
value of the exchange rate measures the relative price of traded goods to nontraded
goods—the “real” exchange rate of trade theory.9 In public finance models, it is
common to use the consumer price index as numéraire, which is convenient for welfare
analysis.The choice is only a matter of convenience.The model is a neoclassical general
equilibrium model and only determines relative prices.
The underlying domestic price transmission mechanism is presented in Figure 1. A
major shortcoming of the partial equilibrium approach is the assumed complete trans-
mission of world price changes to domestic prices. Figure 1 shows the price links in the
CGE model. Domestic prices of exported and imported products are determined by
world market prices plus any trade taxes (given the small-country assumption).
However, domestic sectoral producer prices (PX) are CET cost functions of export
prices (PE) and domestic prices (PD). Similarly, the composite good prices (PQ) are
CES cost functions of import prices (PM) and domestic prices. The strength of price
transmission effects depends both on elasticities (of substitution and transformation)
and on trade shares. There are also links working through intermediate inputs, which
include imported and domestic goods, and finally to factor prices. In this model, the
policy bias against agriculture will depend on differences in policies, trade shares, and
the degree of tradability between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors.
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Measures and Policy Experiments in the CGE Framework
In the general equilibrium approach used here, the measure of agricultural bias is cap-
tured through various measures of the terms of trade between aggregate agriculture
and aggregate nonagriculture.They are defined as the ratio of the relevant price indices.
For example, the agricultural terms of trade with respect to gross output X in domes-
tic producer prices can be represented as follows:
(11)
where
(12)
The share parameters are the gross output shares of individual subsectors in the agri-
cultural and nonagricultural sectors. The sum of these shares within each aggregate
sector equals one.
The aggregate sectoral producer price indices are defined as:
(13)
The ToT measures within the CGE framework are constructed using the following
prices and corresponding quantity weights:
PM M domestic market price and quantity of imports
PE E domestic market price and quantity of exports
PQ Q composite good price and quantity
PX X producer price and gross output
PVA X value-added price and gross output.
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Figure 1. Domestic Price Transmission Mechanism
Agricultural bias is measured by various agricultural ToT indices:
AGMTOT agricultural TOT regarding PM and M
AGETOT agricultural TOT regarding PE and E.
AGQTOT agricultural TOT regarding PQ and Q
AGXTOT agricultural TOT regarding PX and X
AGVATOT agricultural TOT regarding PVA and X.
A 28-sector—of which 13 are agricultural sectors—social accounting matrix (SAM)
for Tanzania (base year 1992) provides the starting database for our policy simula-
tions.10 Given that the data are preliminary and that we start from a distortion-free
base solution, the model should be seen as reflecting a “stylized” version of a Tanza-
nia-like economy. The model can be seen as characterizing a highly-agricultural, trade-
dependent, developing country.
The structure of the economy is presented in Table 1, which provides sector-specific
information on production, value-added, and trade shares; export and import ratios
with respect to total production and absorption; and elasticities of substitution and
transformation. The characteristics of this economic structure that significantly influ-
ence the results of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
(a) The share of agriculture in total gross production is 42%, and 56% in value-added
at market prices. This economy is dominated by agriculture.
(b) The share of agriculture in total exports is only 26%, but the two most important
agricultural export sectors (coffee and tea) have export-production ratios of
around 80%. Most exports are nonagricultural, but there are some very export-
dependent agricultural sectors.
(c) There are virtually no agricultural imports. Most imports are intermediate and
capital goods for which elasticities of substitution with domestic production is low.
One sector, “fuel”, which includes petrochemicals, has high import and export
ratios, indicating the existence of “passthrough” exports.
Four experiments are carried out to simulate the impact of introducing significant
industrial protection and taxation of agricultural exports, with and without a fixed
exchange rate.11 These experiments are designed to simulate an “anti-trade” policy
regime typical of many African countries in the past. We also do additional 
experiments to simulate the impact of devaluation under a structural adjustment
program.
The first experiment simulates an “import substitution industrialization” (ISI) 
strategy by imposing a 25% import tariff (tm(iagn) = 25%) on all nonagricultural
imports. This sort of ISI strategy should hurt agriculture by: (a) raising the relative
price of nonagricultural goods, which are import substitutes, compared with agricul-
ture; (b) increasing the costs of production in agriculture (since nonagricultural com-
modities are used as intermediate inputs in agriculture); and (c) inducing an
appreciation of the exchange rate which will hurt export-oriented agricultural sectors
producing tradable goods.
The induced appreciation of the exchange rate represents an indirect effect which
is considered to be independent in the partial equilibrium approach to measuring agri-
cultural bias. To estimate the separate effect of this appreciation, in experiment 2 we
also increase the nonagricultural tariff as in experiment 1, but fix the exchange rate,
which serves to isolate the indirect exchange-rate effect. With the exchange rate fixed,
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the model is solved by endogenously adjusting the trade balance (as discussed above).
This additional experiment allows comparison with the partial equilibrium measures
which analyze the effects of taxation under the assumption of a fixed exchange 
rate.
The third and fourth experiments simulate the implementation of a 25% tax on all
agricultural exports, again with a free and fixed exchange rate (te(iag) = 25% and EXR
is either free or fixed). The impact of an export tax on agriculture in a partial equilib-
rium framework with a fixed exchange rate is referred to as the direct bias against 
agriculture. In the general equilibrium framework, the effect of an export tax can be
divided into two components: (a) price changes due to trade price transmission effects,
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Table 1. Structure of the Model Economy
Composition (%) Ratios (%) Elasticities
X VA E M EX/X IM/Q SIGT SIGC
Cotton 0.5 0.3 — — — — — —
Sisal 0.3 0.3 0.8 — 22.6 — 3.0 —
Tea 0.2 0.2 2.6 — 79.7 — 3.0 —
Coffee 0.8 0.8 9.7 — 82.9 — 2.0 —
Sugar 0.4 0.3 1.4 — 27.8 — 3.0 —
Tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.8 — 53.2 — 3.0 —
Cashew 0.1 0.1 0.7 — 46.5 — 3.0 —
Pyrethrum 0.1 0.1 0.5 — 44.1 — 3.0 —
Maize 7.5 10.7 1.5 — 1.5 — 3.0 —
Wheat 0.1 0.2 — 0.0 — 5.4 — 4.0
Paddy 1.9 2.8 — — — — — —
Other Agriculture 21.8 29.3 5.4 0.1 1.8 0.1 3.0 1.1
Livestock 8.0 11.3 2.2 0.1 2.0 0.2 3.0 1.1
Mining 1.5 1.8 1.4 6.7 6.7 44.9 1.1 4.0
Food/beverages 5.4 3.2 4.9 7.1 6.5 21.2 1.1 4.0
Textiles 5.8 4.0 27.3 7.8 33.5 25.2 4.0 1.1
Fuel 0.1 0.1 0.8 4.8 62.4 95.7 1.1 0.8
Other chemicals 0.9 0.6 0.9 9.5 6.5 64.5 1.1 0.8
Nonmetal 1.0 0.4 1.5 3.5 10.7 40.1 1.1 0.8
Metal 2.2 1.4 2.9 31.9 9.5 73.2 1.1 0.8
T&M equipment 2.1 2.5 0.1 22.4 0.2 64.1 1.1 0.8
Electr./water 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 4.0 1.1
Construction 5.4 1.5 — 0.0 — 0.1 — 4.0
Commerce 16.6 12.3 21.0 0.3 9.0 0.3 4.0 1.1
Trans./comm. 5.9 8.3 4.8 0.4 5.8 1.3 4.0 1.1
Financial inst. 4.7 5.6 — 0.9 — 3.2 — 4.0
Other services 0.7 0.7 8.6 4.4 83.2 85.6 1.1 4.0
Public admin. 4.9 0.8 0.1 — 0.2 — 4.0 —
Total/avg. AG 41.8 56.4 25.7 0.2 3.4 0.1 — —
Total/avg. non-AG 58.2 43.6 74.3 99.8 8.7 23.3 — —
X, output; VA, value-added; E, exports; M, imports; Q, absorption; SIGT, elasticity of transformation; SIGC,
elasticity of substitution.
Source: Distortion-free base solution of the CGE model for Tanzania using a preliminary 1990 SAM (Wobst,
1998).
given the CES-CET functional structure of the model; and (b) price changes due to
the induced exchange-rate effect.
In the partial equilibrium literature, a major source of policy bias is the overvalua-
tion of the exchange rate, even with no sectoral price distortions. To assess this effect,
we perform a series of five experiments where we leave all sectoral taxes at zero but
reduce the base value of the trade balance in 20% increments, reaching zero in the last
experiment. In these experiments, the real exchange is solved endogenously, given the
exogenous trade balance.12 A trade balance of zero is often specified as defining the
“appropriate” equilibrium value of the exchange rate in the partial equilibrium liter-
ature. Defining an equilibrium or “sustainable” trade balance is a macro issue, outside
the scope of our static general equilibrium model. In the CGE model, there is a func-
tional relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance, and hence
between the trade balance and measures of policy bias arising from changes in the
equilibrium exchange rate. The five experiments indicate this relationship.
4. Results
Industrial Protection and Agricultural Export Taxes
Table 2 presents the impact on the various agricultural ToT measures of the imposi-
tion of the 25% nonagriculture import and agriculture export taxes, with and without
a fixed exchange rate. The agricultural ToT measures and their underlying aggregate
price indices are shown in the rows.The first two agricultural ToT measures with regard
to traded goods (AGMTOT and AGETOT ) capture price-incentive effects which are close to
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Table 2. Industrial Protection and Export Taxes in Agriculture
Price indices tm(iagn) tm(iagn) and te(iag) te(iag) and
(base = 100) = 25% EXR fix = 25% EXR fix
AGMTOT 80.0 80.0 100.0 100.0
PMAG 94.7 100.0 105.3 100.0
PMAGN 118.3 125.0 105.3 100.0
AGETOT 100.0 100.0 75.0 75.0
PEAG 94.7 100.0 78.9 75.0
PEAGN 94.7 100.0 105.3 100.0
AGQTOT 94.4 90.2 93.9 98.8
PQAG 98.9 96.9 96.8 99.3
PQAGN 104.7 107.3 103.1 100.5
AGXTOT 98.3 94.9 93.7 98.0
PXAG 98.7 96.9 96.2 98.5
PXAGN 100.4 102.2 102.7 100.6
AGVATOT 100.1 96.0 92.4 97.5
PVAAG 98.1 96.1 95.8 98.4
PVAAGN 98.0 100.1 103.7 100.9
EXR 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.00
the partial equilibrium measure. The last three measures (AGQTOT , AGXTOT , and AGVATOT )
capture the transmission of price changes from traded goods through commodity,
output, and value-added prices, reflecting general equilibrium linkages, the Armington
specification of imperfect substitutability, and the operation of factor markets.
The last row shows that the exchange rate, which is fixed in experiments 2 and 4,
appreciates by approximately 5% in experiment 1 and depreciates by 5% in experi-
ment 3.The signs of the induced changes are predictable from theory—the magnitudes
depend on model parameters and the structure of the economy.
The first agricultural ToT measure (AGMTOT ) shows a 20% deterioration for experi-
ment 2 due to the 25% increase of the nonagricultural price index PMAGN .World market
prices in equation 5 are fixed in all experiments, given the small-country assumption,
and the exchange rate is fixed as part of experiment 2. In the first two experiments, the
25% increase in import tariffs on nonagricultural production (tm(iagn) = 25%) leads
to a 20% decrease in the terms of trade (1/1.25 = 80%). In experiment 2, with a fixed
exchange rate, the tariff directly increases PMAGN while agricultural import prices remain
unchanged. In experiment 1, the induced appreciation of the exchange rate changes
all import prices, leaving relative prices, and hence the agricultural terms of trade,
unchanged. Experiments 3 and 4, in which the domestic prices of agricultural exports
are changed, have no influence on AGMTOT (as can be seen from equation (5)). With a
fixed exchange rate, the export tax does not affect domestic import prices. Moreover,
with a flexible exchange rate, as in experiment 1, PMAG and PMAGN change proportion-
ately, leaving the terms of trade unaffected.
Tracing the effects of the four experiments on AGETOT is equivalent to tracing the
effects on AGMTOT as shown above. A 25% export tax on all agricultural sectors leads
(see equation (6)) to a decrease in PEAG of 25% in experiment 4, where the exchange
rate is fixed. Since PEAGN remains unchanged, AGETOT decreases by 25%. With a flexible
exchange rate (in experiment 3), the depreciation of the exchange rate following the
relative price decrease of exports affects PMAG and PMAGN equally and therefore has no
additional effect on AGETOT. Experiments 1 and 2 have no influence on AGETOT, as can
be seen from equation (6). With a fixed exchange rate, the import tariff does not affect
domestic export prices. With a flexible exchange rate, the induced appreciation in
experiment 1 leads to the same relative changes of PEAG and PEAGN.
We now turn to the impact of the experiment series on AGQTOT, AGXTOT, and AGVATOT.
The third measure of the agricultural terms of trade (AGQTOT ) is defined with respect
to composite good prices and captures the Armington specification; i.e., the imperfect
substitutability between imports and domestic products (equation (9)). The imposition
of a 25% nonagricultural import tariff reduces AGQTOT to 90.2% when the exchange
rate is fixed. The composite good price index of nonagricultural commodities (PQAGN ),
which is affected by domestic import prices (PM) as well as domestic supply prices
(PDC), increases by only 7.3% instead of the 25% increase of PMAGN. For a “semitrad-
able” good, both the import share and the substitution elasticity affect how changes in
import prices are transmitted through to the price of domestic substitutes, and hence
to the price of the composite good.
The agricultural price index drops to 96.9%. When the exchange rate is free, these
effects are dampened and AGQTOT drops to only 94.4%. The effect of not allowing the
exchange rate feedback on AGQTOT amounts to 4.2% points. Allowing exchange rate
flexibility means that agriculture gets hurt less.
The 25% export tax on agricultural commodities affects the composite good price
index of agriculture by only 0.7% owing to the limited magnitude of agricultural
exports compared with domestic supply—most of agriculture is not traded. When
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exchange rate feedback is allowed, EXR depreciates and the agricultural composite
good price index drops while nonagriculture gains. The net result is that the export tax
affects AGQTOT relatively little when the exchange rate is fixed, but substantially more—
and negatively—with a flexible exchange rate.
The fourth agricultural ToT measure (AGXTOT) is defined with respect to producer
prices (PX), reflecting the imperfect transformation between domestic produce and
exports in the CET function. The 25% import tariff in experiments 1 and 2 lowers PXAG
in a similar way as PQAG. Moreover, allowing for exchange rate flexibility results in an
appreciation of the exchange rate and improves PXAG compared with the fixed exchange
rate scenario. This result is a reflection of the very large share of nontraded agricul-
tural products in total agriculture, which implies that aggregate agriculture is favored
when the exchange rate appreciates. In addition, the price index of nonagricultural pro-
ducer prices is higher under a fixed exchange rate.
In sum, AGXTOT is 98.3% under a flexible exchange rate and 94.9% under a fixed
exchange rate. In case of the 25% export tax on agricultural products in experiments
3 and 4, the agricultural terms of trade are affected more under a flexible exchange
rate than under a fixed exchange rate, while the direct impact of the export tax appears
relatively limited.The depreciation following the imposition of the export tax in exper-
iment 3 has a negative influence on the agricultural terms of trade, AGXTOT. This result
again is linked to the high share of nontraded agriculture, which is hurt in relative terms
by a depreciation. In the partial equilibrium literature, most agricultural commodities
are treated as perfectly substitutable tradable goods for which eliminating an over-
valuation of the exchange rate is beneficial.
Changes in the terms of trade in value-added prices, AGVATOT, provide the most appro-
priate bias measure because they indicate relative incentives to “pull” productive
factors between sectors. A nonagricultural tariff combined with a flexible exchange
rate slightly improves the terms of trade of agriculture, whereas agriculture is hurt in
relative terms under a fixed exchange rate. As noted above, agriculture is relatively
nontraded, and therefore benefits from an appreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly,
in the export tax experiment, exchange rate flexibility implies that AGVATOT drops com-
pared with the situation with fixed exchange rate.
Impacts of an Overvaluation of the Exchange Rate
The results of the experiment series in which we gradually reduce the trade balance
to zero are reported in Figures 2, 3, and 4. Figure 2 shows that the trade balance is
eliminated in five consecutive steps, resulting in exchange rate depreciations starting
at almost 4% at the beginning and declining to about 1% at the last step. Elimination
of the trade deficit leads to a depreciation of 10%. The corresponding adjustments in
real imports and exports are shown in Figure 3. Imports move very little while exports
increase by around 130%—the improvement of the balance of payments is mainly a
consequence of export performance. The import-dependent nature of the economy,
with high trade shares and low substitution elasticities for intermediates and capital
goods, makes it difficult to reduce imports. They even increase a little in spite of the
depreciation, which reflects the import-intensive nature of exports. This result (typical
of many developing countries) underlines the need to maintain imports at an adequate
level if export promotion is to succeed.
Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates that although the last three agricultural terms-of-trade
indices fall as the exchange rate depreciates, the changes are small—under 5%. The
first two indices, AGMTOT and AGETOT, do not change since changes in the exchange rate
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Figure 2. Exchange Rate Depreciation
Figure 3. Real Trade and the Trade Balance
Figure 4. Agricultural Terms of Trade and the Trade Balance
effect agriculture and nonagriculture symmetrically. The other three agricultural ToT
measures (AGQTOT, AGXTOT, and AGVATOT) decrease in the beginning owing to the induced
depreciation of the exchange rate. However, the effect tapers off in the middle of the
experiment series, and the measures improve a little at the end. The turnaround is due
to the fact that agricultural exports increase with depreciation and, by the last two
experiments in the series, grow to be a significant share of agricultural output. With
depreciation, traded agriculture becomes more important (see Figure 5).
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the extent of the policy bias against agriculture in a general
equilibrium framework. Various measures of the agricultural terms of trade were con-
structed to assess the impact of industrial protection, agricultural export taxes, and
overvaluation of the exchange rate on the balance between agriculture and nonagri-
culture.The general equilibrium measures have been compared with earlier work mea-
suring policy bias in a partial equilibrium framework.
Our results indicate that trade policies have a significant but much lower negative
impact on relative prices in agriculture than would be indicated by partial equilibrium
measures. The general equilibrium framework captures indirect effects of trade poli-
cies that work through induced changes in the equilibrium exchange rate—an effect
that is not captured in partial equilibrium analysis. We use the model to compute the
empirical importance of this indirect effect, which is potentially significant. The impo-
sition of a nonagricultural tariff with a fixed exchange rate leads to a much stronger
deterioration of the ToT measures compared with a flexible exchange rate scenario,
since the appreciation of the exchange rate actually benefits agriculture. The imposi-
tion of an export tax on all agricultural sectors with a fixed exchange rate leads to a
much lower deterioration compared with a flexible exchange rate scenario, since the
export-tax-induced depreciation of the exchange rate hurts the relatively nontraded
aggregate agriculture in the case of a flexible exchange rate.
A separate series of experiments was carried out to assess the impact of overvalu-
ation of the exchange rate—characteristic of many developing countries. In earlier
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Figure 5. Real Output for Some Agricultural Sectors
work, in a partial equilibrium framework, comparative work in a number of countries
identified exchange rate overvaluation as the largest source of policy bias. In a general
equilibrium framework, incorporating nontraded goods and imperfect substitutability
between domestic and foreign goods, these results are seriously qualified. In our arche-
type model of Tanzania, agriculture has a large share of nontraded goods and traded
nonagriculture goods have relatively low substitution elasticities. These characteristics
reflect many developing countries. In this environment, we find a much smaller impact
on agriculture of depreciating the exchange rate than is indicated by partial equilib-
rium measures. Our results are contrary to the “conventional wisdom” that a depreci-
ation benefits agriculture. General equilibrium effects are indeed important.
This paper deals only with trade policies and their impact on aggregate agriculture.
It is straightforward to expand the analysis to include sector-specific domestic tax and
subsidy policies and their impacts on particular agricultural sectors. The CGE model
is an appropriate analytical framework for such analysis.
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Notes
1. The findings of a World Bank comparative study during 1987–90 involving 18 countries are
reported in Krueger (1992) and Schiff and Valdes (1992). Eight country studies done at the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) from 1981 to 1990 are contained in Bautista
and Valdes (1993), together with regional surveys of the literature in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
2. For the extended discussion on empirical testing of the law of one price and further refer-
ences to earlier works, see Ceglowski (1994).
3. For a description of this CGE model specification, see Deverajan et al. (1997) and de Melo
and Robinson (1989).
4. For a recent survey on general equilibrium analysis applied to agriculture, see Hertel (1997).
5. A related measure of government support to agriculture, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent
(PSE), was developed during the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations and includes both trade
and nontrade policies. It is also a partial equilibrium measure which treats trade basically the
same way as the KSV approach (Josling and Tangermann, 1989).
6. In some of the IFPRI country studies referred to above, trade restrictions (including import
tariffs and export taxes) are systematically examined as a major source of real exchange rate
distortion; see, for example, Bautista (1987) for an empirical investigation of the Philippine case.
7. The complete specification of the model is given in Annex II in Bautista et al. (1998) and
available under <http://www.cgiar.org/ifpri> or on request from the authors.
8. In fact, in most of their country studies, overvaluation was the greatest source of policy bias
against agriculture.
9. See Devarajan et al. (1993) for a discussion of the real exchange rate in this class of CGE
models.
10. The SAM is based on preliminary and incomplete data for Tanzania. A major work program
is underway to improve the database. See Wobst (1998) for a description of an updated 1992
SAM. Note that the reported economic structure is for the distortion-free base solution of the
model. The SAM was developed as part of a research project which is developing compar-
ative SAM data for a number of African countries, including: Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
11. Other government policies such as sales taxes or fixed producer prices could also be inves-
tigated within the CGE framework. However, in the present analysis, we focus on trade-
policy-induced distortions.
12. We could also have fixed (and varied) the exchange rate and “closed” the model by solving
for the corresponding equilibrium trade balances endogenously. The qualitative results would
be the same—we trace out the functional relationship between the real exchange rate and the
balance of trade.
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